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Essay: When Less Is More-Can Reducing 
Penalties Reduce Household Violence? 
Virginia E. Hench· 
The weapons of choice are fists, hands, feet, telephones, knives, and 
thrown objects. I 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Hawai'i today, we are in relatively little danger of violent crime on the 
streets, but for the one Hawai'i woman in five who has been violently 
assaulted in her home, our low street crime rate is cold comfort.2 Every 
twenty-eight days, a woman in Hawai'i is murdered by her present or former 
husband or partner; three out of four are murdered after they leave their 
abuser. Attacks on household members are more common than attacks on 
strangers, and the injuries inflicted are far more serious than injuries sustained 
in attacks by strangers.3 Shocking as they are, the statistics do not tell the 
whole story, since much household Violence goes unreported.4 The FBI 
estimates conservatively that only one in ten incidents of household violence 
is reported; some experts believe that reported abuse is as Iowa percentage as 
one in one hundred attacks. S 
• © 1996, Virginia E. Hench, Assistant Professor, The William S. Richardson School of 
Law, University of Hawai'i, Manoa Professor Hench was a member of the Committee to 
Conduct Comprehensive Review of the Hawai'i Penal Code which drafted the proposed 
amendments to Hawai'i's Penal Code addressed in this Essay. 
I Marilyn Kim, No Way Out, HONOLULU MAGAZINE, Sept. 1995, at 48, 56; League of 
Women Voters and Hawaii State Commission on the Status of Women, REPORT: DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE F AMIL Y COURT MONITORING PROJECT (Sept. 1996) [hereinafter REPORT] (on file 
with the author). 
2 Kim, supra note l,at48,56. SeeREPORT,supranote l,atSummary(unpaginated). In 
Hawai'i, from 1985 through 1994, nearly 30% of alI homicides in the state arose out of 
domestic violence, compared with 15% nationally in 1994. Id. 
3 Donna M. Welch, Mandatory A"est of Domestic Abusers: Panacea or Perpetuation of 
the Problem of Abuse?, 43 DEPAUL L. REv. 1133, 1134 n.IO (1994). See also Carolyn M. 
SampselIe et aI., Violence Against Women: The Scope and Significance of the Problem, in 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: NURSING REsEARCH, EDUCATION, AND PRACTICE ISSUES 3, 8 
(Carolyn M. SampselIe ed., 1992) (family violence affects all economic classes). 
4 Welch, supra note 3, at 1135. REPORT, supra note I, at Summary (unpaginated) (only 
a small fraction of abuse is reported to police; by the time an arrest is made, abuse is likely to 
have been going on for years). 
S Calling Police Protects Abused Wives. Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1986, at A9. 
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Household violence is the number one health risk for women today.6 It is 
also a risk to our society at large. As Attorney General Janet Reno has 
pointed out, "If we don't stop violence in the home, we are never going to stop 
it on the streets of America."7 Household violence is the primary source of 
crime for virtually every major social problem Hawai'i faces today, from 
child abuse, juvenile delinquency, gang activity, alcoholism and drug abuse, 
to rape, robbery, home invasion, and murder.8 These problems touch all of us 
in some way, and they are growing. 
It is a fact that children who grow up in violent homes, even if they are not 
abused themselves, commit three times the serious crimes than those who did 
not grow up in such violent homes.9 The children of these violent homes are 
six times more likely to attempt suicide, 24 percent more likely to commit 
sexual assaults, 74 percent more likely to commit other crimes against the 
person, and 50 percent more likely to abuse drugs and alcohol. 10 A Hazleton 
Foundation study documented that 63 percent of young men between the ages 
of 11 and 20 now doing time for homicide have killed their mothers' 
batterer.11 
For girls, violent homes are likely to lead to becoming teenage prostitutes, 
runaways, and having babies at far too young an age.12 Not only do the babies 
of these girls from violent homes tend to recreate the cycle of their mothers' 
6 Fonner Surgeon General C. Everett Koop identified family violence as the leading health 
risk to women today, causing more injuries than automobile accidents, muggings and rapes 
combined. Joan Zorzo, The Criminal Law oj Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, J 970-J 990, 83 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46, 46 (1992). Between 1.8 and 6 mi11ion women a year are 
assaulted or killed by men with whom they have been intimately involved. Jan Hoffinan, When 
Men Hit Women, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 16, 1992, §6 at 25; Martha Shirk, Domestic Violence 
is a Leading HazardJor Women, ST. loUIS POST-DISPATCH, May 6,1992, at lOA. See also 
Angelo Bruscas, Athletes Cross the Line: Simpson Not Only One With Record oj Domestic 
Violence, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, June 23,1994, at AI (family violence is the number 
one cause of homicidal death in women). 
7 Symposium: A Leadership Summit; The Link Between Violence and Poverty in the Lives 
oj Women and Their Children, 3 GEO. J.F.P. 5, 5 (Fall 1995) (keynote speech of Attorney 
General Janet Reno). 
8 Sarah Bue!, Dealing With Family Violence Through Community Partnerships, Audio 
Tape of Plenary Session, held by A.P.P.A. 19th Annual Training Institute (Sept. 11-14, 1994) 
(on file with the author) [hereinafter Buel Tape]. 
9 Welch, supra note 3, at 1136-37, n.29. See MURRAY A. STRAUS ET AL., BEHIND CLOSED 
DOORS: VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY 3,122 (1980). See Helen Rubenstein Holden, 
Comment, Does the Legal System Batter Women? Vindicating Battered Women's Constitutional 
Rights to Adequate Police Protection, 21 ARIz. ST. L.J. 705, 708 (1989) (relating links between 
poverty, social isolation, race, age, and family abuse). 
10 Buel Tape, supra note 8. 
11 Id. 
12 Id.(commenting on a study at the University of Washington which has documented the 
number one common factor among pregnant teens is that they grew up in a violent household). 
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lives, they now represent 92 percent of the convicted felons between the ages 
of 19 and 34.13 The cycle repeats, as about one out of every four children of 
the most violent households uses at least some physical force on his spouse 
in any given year; 14 one in ten of the husbands who grew up in violent families 
seriously injure their family and household members, IS over three times the 
rate for men who did not grow up in such violent homes. 16 By cutting off the 
recurring generational cycle of violence in the family, we can also cut off the 
primary cause of drug addiction, alcoholism, juvenile delinquency and gang 
activity. 17 
In the first seven years after Hawai'i first enacted Hawaii Revised Statutes 
("H.R.S.") section 709-906, Abuse of Family and Household Members,18 only 
three batterers were convicted. 19 Only one of the three was sentenced to jail 
time, and his sentence was suspended.20 Section 709-906 was amended on 
May 25, 1985 to require the present mandatory minimum sentence of 48 hours 
in jail,21 but it also provided for the optional one-year sentence which has 
caused backlogs and resulted in many batterers going free.22 Under present 
law, a first offense of abuse offamily and household members without serious 
physical injury is classified as a full misdemeanor,23 carrying a possible one 




16 STRAUS, supra note 9, at ISO-51; William J. Goode, Force and Violence in the Family, 
33 J. MARRIAGE&FAM. 624,633 (1971). 
17 STRAUS, supra note 9, at 121-22; Robert Geffner & Alan Rosenbaum, Characteristics 
and Treatment of Batterers, 8 BEHA V. SCI. & L. 131, 132 (1990); Lisa G. Lerman, Mediation 
of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 HARV. 
WOMEN'S L.J. 57. 63 (1984). 




22 See id. at 6. 
2J HAw. REV. STAT. § 709-906(5) (abuse of family or household member) and HAW. REv. 
STAT. § 709-906(4) (refusal to comply with lawful order ofa police officer) are full misdemean-
ors. See text of HAW. REv. STAT. § 709-906, infra Appendix D. HAW. REv. STAT. § 586-4 
(violation of temporary restraining order) and HAW. REv. STAT. § 586-11 (violation of a 
domestic abuse order for protection) are also full misdemeanors. See text of HAW. REv. STAT. 
§ 586-11, infra Appendix D. 
24 HAW. REv. STAT. § 706-663 (1993). It provides: 
After considemtion of the factors set forth in sections 706-606 and 706-621, the court 
may sentence a person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor or a petty misdemeanor 
to imprisonment for a definite term to be fixed by the court and not to exceed one year 
in the case of a misdemeanor or thirty days in the case of a petty misdemeanor. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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jury trial under both the Hawai'i and United States Constitutions.2S Defen-
dants charged under the present law ask for jury trials because jury trials are 
inherently more expensive and time-consuming than bench trials.26 With forty 
to fifty new cases coming into the system weekly, 27 courts quickly become 
backlogged,28 resulting in as many as one-third of those charged with abuse 
of family and household members having their cases dismissed before trial 
because of the courts' backlogs.29 In 92 percent of the cases that do go to trial, 
the jury acquits the defendant, in part because juries in domestic violence 
cases tend to blame the victim and exonerate the attacker.30 (This is in stark 
contrast with other criminal cases, in which roughly 90 percent of those 
charged are convicted).l' . 
Simple mathematics tell a shocking story: under our present misdemeanor 
law, of 100 men arrested for misdemeanor household violence, 66 will go to 
trial, and 61 will be acquitted. With such a high probability of acquittal at 
trial, few plead guilty.32 For every 100 arrests resulting in charges filed, we 
bear the burden of 66 jury trials to get five convictions. The five who are 
convicted will be sentenced to approximately 48 hours. Most of those who 
2S See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; HAW. CoNST. art. I, § 13. This right refers to the 
constitutional guarantee of jury trial in "serious" criminal cases; the right to jury trial does not 
apply in the case of "petty" offenses. See, e.g., State v. Kasprzycki, 64 Haw. 374, 641 P.2d 978 
(1982) (citing State v. Shak, 51 Haw. 612, 466 P.2d 422, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 930 (1970» 
(defendant charged with petty misdemeanor subject to maximum sentence of thirty days con-
finement anellor fine is not entitled to jury trial). 
Under the Federal Constitution, the United States Supreme Court has held that two 
criteria are relevant in determining whether an offense is petty or serious. The first is . 
whether the offense is by its nature serious. If so, the size of the penalty that may be 
imposed is only of minor relevance, and the right of trial by jury attaches. . .. If the 
offense is not by its nature serious, however, the magnitude of the potential penalty set 
for its punishment becomes important, since it is an indication of the ethical judgments 
and standards of the community. 
51 Haw. at 614-15, 466 P.2d at 424 (citations omitted). Six months is the dividing line between 
serious and petty offenses. Baldwin V. New York, 399 U.S. 66,70 (1970) (potential sentence 
exceeding six months' imprisonment is sufficiently severe to take offense out of the category 
of "petty''). See also, e.g., Codispoti V. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506,512 (1974), cited with 
approval in Kasprzycki, 64 Haw. at 375, 641 P.2d at 979 (thirty day possible maximum 
sentence cannot trigger right to jury trial). 
26 Notes from Penal Code Commission deliberations (on file with the author) (comments 
of Office of the Public Defender). See also infra Appendix B (many cases dismissed because 
of backlog). 
27 See infra Appendix B. 
28 See id. 
29 See id. 
30 Notes from Penal Code Commission deliberations, supra note 26. 
31 [d. 
32 [d. 
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are sentenced will have served that time during their initial pre-trial deten-
tion,33 so they will walk out of the courtroom free and clear. This is not the 
fault of the courts. The problem is simply that the sentencing range for a first 
offense is set at a level that triggers the right to jury trial.34 As the Committee 
noted: 
As this comment is written, efforts are being made to reduce the number of 
household member abuse cases awaiting jury trials in 0' ahu' s family court, but 
every week occasions an average of 40 to 50 more jury trial demands. Existing 
and foreseeable judicial resources are inadequate to adjudicate these cases; in 
consequence, many cases are dismissed for want of speedy trials, pled to other 
charges in order to avoid the mandatory 48 hours. Defense counsel cannot be 
faulted for seeking jury trials in a system that guarantees jury trials. Nor can the 
Judiciary be faulted for giving priority to murder and other serious felony cases. 
Nor should the Legislature be faulted if it opts to solve the problem by 
reclassifying the crime so as to eliminate a penalty - on the books but never 
employed - that, because of sheer availability, triggers the right to jury trial. 35 
Clearly, something needs to be done. After more than a year of study, the 
Hawai'i Committee to Conduct Comprehensive Review of the Hawai'i Penal 
Code recommended a simple step toward stopping the violence that has 
become the serpent in our paradise: repealing the current section 709-906,36 
and enacting in its place a statute that would read, in pertinent part: 
§ 709-912. Abuse offamily or household members; penalty. 
(1) A person commits the offense of abuse of family or household members 
if the person intentionally. knowingly, or recklessly physically abuses a 
family or household member. 
(2) A person who commits the offense of abuse of a family or household 
member shall be sentenced as follows: 
33 [d. 
(a) For a first offense, to a one-year tenn of probation with a mandatory 
condition of imprisonment of not less than forty-eight hours and not 
more than thirty days; and 
(b) For any subsequent offense which occurs within five years of a 
previous offense which resulted in a conviction under this section, to 
a one-year tenn of probation with a mandatory condition ofimpris-
onment of not less than thirty days and not more than one year. 37 
34 See infra Appendix B. 
35 [d. 
36 See text of current HAW. REv. STAT. § 709-906 (abuse offamily and household mem-
bers), infra Appendix D. 
37 See text of proposed §§ 709-910 through 709-915 and Committee Commentary, infra 
Appendix A and B. 
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This essay recommends, as a first step, adoption of a proposal set forth in 
the Final Report of the Committee to Conduct Comprehensive Review of the 
Hawai'i Penal Code submitted to the Legislature of the State of Hawai'i,38 
This proposal, which has not yet been acted upon, would change the sen-
tencing provisions of Abuse of Family and Household Member to reduce a 
first offense without serious injury from a full misdemeanor to a petty 
misdemeanor, thus eliminating the right to jury trial for those defendants. 
This proposal is likely to be controversial; it generated significant discus-
sion in the Committee, and this controversy will no doubt be reflected in the 
Legislature and the community at large. The most controversial of the 
proposed changes are those to the punishment provisions for section 709-912 
(abuse of family and household member) and section 709-913(2} (refusal to 
comply with a police officer's order to leave). Opponents of this proposal 
argue fervently and sincerely that reclassification of first offenses to the petty 
misdemeanor level represents a failure to support the victims of domestic 
violence,39 but as the Committee notes, "What better way to combat the 
problem we rightly deplore than with actual punishment administered prompt-
ly?'>40 The first step in attacking Hawai'i's crime problems at their roots is to 
adopt the Committee's recommendations and to enact section 709-912, which 
would eliminate the right to jury trial that exists under current section 706-
663,41 by eliminating the purely symbolic one-year sentencing option, 
retaining the 48 hour mandatory minimum prison sentence, and adding a 
38 Final Report of the Committee to Conduct Comprehensive Review of the Hawai' i Penal 
Code, [hereinafter FINAL REPORT], as submitted to the Eighteenth Legislature of the State of 
Hawai'i on December 28, 1994 (on file with the author). According to State Senator Ray 
Graulty's office, the revised Code has not yet been reported to the full Legislature for action. 
Telephone interview with Sen. Graulty's office (Sept. 9, 1996). 
The Committee to Conduct Comprehensive Review of the Hawai'i Penal Code was created 
pursuant to the mandate of 1993 Haw. Sess. L., Act 284, § 2 at 525-26 (H.B. No. 741, H.D. 2, 
S.D. 2, C.D. I). The Committee consisted of thirty members, including judges at the appellate, 
first, second. and third circuit courts; the district courts of the first circuit; representatives of the 
Adult Probation Division, the Department of the Attorney General of Hawai'i, the Department 
of Public Safety's Office of the Director, Special Services Division, and Hawai'i Paroling 
Authority; the Adult Mental Health Division of the Department of Mental Health; the William 
S. Richardson School of Law faculty; the Center for Youth Research; the Sex Abuse Treatment 
Center; the Domestic Violence Legal Hotline; the Honolulu Police Department; the Offices of 
the Prosecuting Attorney of the City and County of Honolulu and County of Maui; the Office 
of the Public Defender, and the private defense bar. Letter from Associate Hawai'i Supreme 
Court Justice Steven Levinson to the Honorable Norman Mizuguchi, December 28, 1994, at 1-2 
(on file with the author). 
39 FINAL REPORT, supra note 38. 
40 [d. 
41 See text of HAW. REv. STAT. § 706-663, supra note 24. 
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mandatory one-year probation period. This essay explores some of the 
reasons for the Committee's proposed changes, the emotional responses these 
proposed changes have triggered, and why implementation of these changes 
would benefit Hawai'i. 
II. THE PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE: INTERVENTION AT THE PETIY 
MISDEMEANOR STAGE 
To discuss these issues rationally, it is important to be clear on what is 
being proposed. The proposed enactment will not apply to repeat offenses, or 
to cases involving serious injury; these matters will continue to be prosecuted 
as assaults under section 707-710 or section 707-711.42 The proposed changes 
likewise would not reduce felony assault to a misdemeanor.43 The amend-
ments will apply solely to cases that do not rise to the felony assault levels of 
707-710 and 711,44 assuring that there are consequences for the very first of-
fense. Ninety-five percent of the sentences imposed under section 709-90645 
are for the minimum 48 hours of imprisonment, 46 and the proposed amend-
ments retain 48 hours of imprisonment as a mandatory minimum sentence.47 
In addition, the proposed law would add a one year mandatory probation,48 
which has the advantage of not triggering the right to jury tria1.49 Additional-
ly, probation makes it possible for the system to provide supervision, counsel-
ing, and further penalties for any infraction. so 
It is understandable that we are reluctant to label any abuse of a family or 
household member "petty." Symbolism is potent, and the word ''petty'' 
carries a lot of emotional baggage. Nevertheless, it is inexcusable to let our 
41 See infra Appendix B; see text of HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 707-710 (Assault in the First 
Degree) and 707-711 (Assault in the Second Degree), infra Appendix D. 
43 See infra Appendix B. By contrast, the Domestic Violence Advocacy Project in Chicago,' 
Illinois, estimated that in 1987, about 90 percent of the domestic violence cases in Cook County 
were charged as misdemeanors, regardless of the severity of the injuries. Matthew Litsky, Note, 
Explaining the Legal System's Inadequate Response to the Abuse of Women: A Lack of 
Coordination, 8 N.Y.L. SeH. J. HUM. RTS. 149, 166-67 (1990). 
44 See infra Appendix B. See text of HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 706-710 and 706-711, infra 
AppendixD. 
4S See text of HAW. REv. STAT. § 706-906, infra Appendix D. 
46 REPORT, supra note I, at 6 (most persons convicted under HAW. REV. STAT. § 709-906 
receive only the mandatory minimum sentence of 48 hours in jail). See Notes from Penal Code 
Commission deliberations, supra note 26 (comments of Office of the Public Defender). See 
also infra Appendix B. 
47 See infra Appendix B. 
48 See id. 
49 See id. 
so Notes from Penal Code Commission deliberations, supra note 26 (comments of Office 
of Public Defender). See also infra Appendix B. 
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squeamishness over terminology prevent us from enacting a powerful crime-
fighting weapon. It is not the label that controls the availability of the jury 
trial, after all it is the availability of that never-invoked one-year sentence for 
first offenses without serious injury. Intervening at the petty misdemeanor 
stage would eliminate this stumbling block.sl 
Ifwe can't bring ourselves to call this offense a "petty" misdemeanor, we 
can call it something else. One proposal before the Committee was to re-Iabel 
what are now called petty misdemeanors and misdemeanors with the less 
emotionally-loaded terms "A and B misdemeanors."S2 So long as we cap the 
available sentence for this category of crime below the level where a jury trial 
is triggered, it does not matter what we call it. 
m. THE FAILED REMEDIES OF THE PAST 
A compelling argument for adopting the Committee's proposal is that the 
remedies of the past have failed to stem the problem. 
A. Safety Orders 
Hawai'i is in the forefront in making safety orders (also known as 
protective orders) accessible to victims of domestic violence.s3 Safety orders 
are enforceable in criminal courts and offer some protection,S4 but a safety 
order .is not a magic bullet. ss It cannot stop the batterer unless he believes that 
51 The Committee noted: 
Current law classifies all instances of these offenses as misdemeanors, even though the 
mandatory jail sentence for first offenders is only 48 hours. The committee proposes, in 
§§ 709-912 and 709-913, to specify the punishment for first offenders as "a one-year term 
of probation with a mandatory condition of imprisonment of not less than forty-eight 
hours and not more than thirty days." 
Committee Commentary, infra Appendix B. 
52 Notes from Penal Code Commission deliberations, supra note 26 (comments of Office 
of the Public Defender). 
5) See Kim, supra note 1 (describing protective or safety orders). See text of HAW. REv. 
STAT. § 586-4 (Temporary Restraining Order), infra Appendix D. 
54 Lisa R. Beck, Note, Protecting Battered Women: A Proposal for Comprehensive 
Domestic Violence Legislation in New York, 15 FORDHAM URB. L.1. 999,1014 n.87 (1987). 
See Buel Tape, supra note 9. 
$$ Beck, supra note 54, at 1015. See Mary Lou Boland, Note, Domestic Violence: Illinois 
Responds to the Plight of the Battered Wife - The Illinois Domestic Violence Act, 161. MAR-
SHALL L. REv. 77,90 (1982) (discussing protective (or safety) orders in Illinois). Such an 
order directs the batterer to stay away from the home or victim and to refrain from funher 
abusive conduct. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 842 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1994) 
(requiring a defendant to stay away from the person or premise or to refrain from verbal or 
physical violence). 
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he will be punished for violating it. If the courts lack the capacity to enforce 
them, safety orders are little more than a symbolic defense against household 
violence, and obtaining one may be the last act the victim ever takes on her 
own behalf. 56 Tragically, she may die with her safety order in hand.s7 
B. Mandatory A"est 
In the landmark Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment, S8 the 
Minneapolis Police Department and Professors Lawrence Sherman and Rich-
ard Berk found that arrest for household violence was the most effective 
deterrent to repeat incidents ofbattering.s9 Such findings led to the adoption 
of what are known as "mandatory arrest" policies, such as that in Hawai'i.60 
56 Kim, supra note I. See Litsky, supra note 43, at 155 (state legislative response to family 
violence in the I 970s was "grossly inadequate"). See also Greg Anderson, Note, Sorichetti v. 
City of New York Tells The Police That Liability Loomsfor Failure to Respond to Domestic 
Violence Situations, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 333 (1985) (discussing a case which held that a 
protective order creates a "special relationship" between the protected party and the police, 
thereby providing the basis for police liability if the protected party is injured). 
57 See Kim, supra note I, at 50 ("My daughter died with her protective order in her hand.''). 
See REPORT, supra note I, at 2-3 (''most domestic violence homicides occur when victims 
attempt to escape or to end the relationship .... Victims who testify in court or at probation 
hearings against their abusers risk threats, retaliation, and further abuse .... Most victims are 
killed when they try to flee their abusers"). See Abigail Trafford, The Divorce Violence Link, 
WASH. POST, June 21, 1994, § Z, at 6. 
58 See Lawrence W. Sherman & Ellen G. Cohn, The Impact of Research on Legal Policy: 
The Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment, 23 LAW & SOC'y REv. 117, 117-19 (1989) 
(encouraging replication of Minnesota experiment in other cities); see also Lawrence W. 
Sherman and Richard A. BerIe, The Specific Deterrence Effects of A"est for Domestic Assault, 
49 AM. SOC. REv. 261 (1984) (advocating adoption of Minnesota experiment by other jurisdic-
tions). 
59 Sherman & Berk, supra note 58, at 261 (six months after police intervention, official and 
victim-based recidivism reports showed significantly less post-intervention violence where 
arrests were made than in cases where the batterer was simply ordered to leave). 
60 See Kim, supra note I (describing Hawai'i's mandatory arrest policy). See REPORT, 
supra note I, at 4, which notes: 
The Hawai'i statute is a presumptive arrest law, which means that police officers may 
make an arrest in any apparent domestic abuse situation. Pursuant to General Order 91-4, 
intemal police policies in all Hawai'i jurisdictions mandate an arrest when there is 
probable cause to believe abuse of a household member has occurred. During the last 
decade, enforcement of Section 709-906 has increased the number of domestic violence 
arrests from 300 in 1986 to 4,665 in 1995 (Honolulu Police Department figures). The 
1995 figure means that police found at least probable cause, or facts and evidence suffi-
cient for arrest, 4,665 times .... 
Police agencies are required to make arrests, gather initial evidence, file reports and refer 
cases to prosecutors .... Prosecutors are required to file charges, work with witnesses, 
46 University ofHawai'i Law Review / Vol. 19:37 
Arrest tells a batterer "that his behavior is a crime, that it must stop, that 
punishment will follow, and that it is sensible to secure treatment to avoid 
repeating the behavior.'>61 Mandatory arrest policies require that in certain sit-
uations, police officers must treat the incident as any other assault and must 
arrest the assailant. 62 
It seems logical to assume that a mandatory arrest policy would be a 
panacea for the problem of household violence. In fact, however, mandatory 
arrest is a classic example of a "get tough" policy that has symbolic value 
with the electorate, but which can lead to a host of problems. Unfortunately, 
mandatory arrest statutes can lead to what is sometimes called the "dual 
arrest" problem, where both partners to a domestic dispute have injuries and . 
accuse the other; an officer in such a case may have no choice but to arrest 
both parties, even ifit appears that one was clearly the aggressor.63 To avoid 
this potentially harsh result, many states have adopted permissive arrest 
policies which allow, but do not require, police to make an arrest without a 
warrant if they have probable cause.64 Presumptive arrest statutes, by contrast, 
provide that the police shall arrest the abuser in certain defined circumstances, 
preserving some level of police discretion in determining whether a particular 
case fits within those circumstances.6s 
address issues of evidence, and prosecute cases in court .... 
[d. 
61 Anthony Bouza, Responding to Domestic Violence, in WOMAN BATTERING: POLICY 
RESPONSES 191, 195 (Michael Steinman ed., 1991). 
62 Nicole M. Montalto, Note, Mandatory Arrest: The District of Columbia's Prevention of 
Domestic Violence Amendment Act of 1990,8 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'y 337,344 
(1992). 
63 Hoffman, supra note 6, at 26. The New Jersey statute, in an attempt to eliminate the 
"dual arrest" scenario, requires an officer in such a case to assess "the comparative extent of the. 
injuries, the history of domestic violence (if any), and other relevant factors." N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 2C:25-21(c)(2) (West Supp. 1993). 
64 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.25.030(b) (Supp. 1996) (warrantless arrest when spouse 
is victim); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601 (8) (Supp. 1994) (warrantless arrest on probable 
cause for felony or misdemeanor domestic violence); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 901.15(6), (7)(a) 
(Harrison 1985 & Supp. 1996) (warrantless arrest on probable cause for violating domestic 
protective order, with evidence of bodily hann or potential for further violence); IDAHO CODE 
§ 19-603(6) (Supp. 1996) (warrantless arrest upon reasonable cause to believe arrestee assaulted 
spouse); 750 I.L.C.S. § 60/301 (1994) (warrantless arrest for crime or violation of protective 
order, on probable cause); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 209A, § 6(7) (West Supp. 1996) (war-
rantless arrest on probable cause for felony or misdemeanor domestic violence, or violating 
restraining order); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-311(2) (1996) (warrantless arrest on probable 
cause for domestic violence or assault upon family or household member); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 
12-29-3(8), 15-15-5(A) (Supp. 1996) (permitting warrantless arrest on probable cause for 
felony or misdemeanor if failure to arrest could result in further violence). 
6S See Beck, supra note 54, at 1036. See, e.g., ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-53-101 (Michie 1993) 
(noting that "immediate intervention through arrest upon probable cause to protect the victim 
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Arrest alone, however, has never been shown to be an effective deterrent.66 
Follow-up studies to the Minneapolis study showed that unless arrest was part 
of a comprehensive program that actually resulted in convictions, arresting the 
batterers could be worse than useless - it could actually be harrnfu1.67 
Professor Sherman, coauthor of the original Minneapolis report, did a similar 
study in Milwaukee, Wisconsin in which the batterer's employment status 
from physical injury is one remedy which should be provided in this state as in other states. "). 
In addition, Idaho law states that: 
[T]he legislature finds that a significant number of homicides, aggravated assaults, and 
assaults and batteries occur within the home between adult members of families .... 
Domestic violence can ... be deterred, prevented or reduced by vigorous prosecution by 
law enforcement agencies and prosecutors and by appropriate attention and concern by 
the courts whenever reasonable cause exists for arrest and prosecution. 
IDAHO CODE § 39-6302 notes (1993). 
66 See Richard A. Berk & Phyllis J. Newton, Does Arrest Really Deter Wife Battery? An 
Effort to Replicate the Findings of the Minneapolis Spouse Abuse Experiment, 50 AM. SOC. 
REv. 253 (1985) (discussing changes in California law and the results ofa follow-up study of 
residents prone to family violence); Beck, supra note 54, at 1035-36. In Connecticut: 
Whenever a peace officer determines upon ... information that a family violence crime 
. . . has been committed within his jurisdiction, he shall arrest the person or persons 
suspected of its commission . . . . The decision to arrest and charge shall not (I) be 
dependent on the specific consent of the victim, (2) consider the relationship of the parties 
or (3) be based solely on a request by the victim. 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38(b) (West Supp. 1994); see also, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 
16-1031 (Supp. 1993) ("A law enforcement officer shall arrest a person if the law enforcement 
officer has probable cause to believe that the person: (I) Committed an intrafamily offense that 
resulted in physical injury .... "); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2307 (Supp. 1993) ("[T]he officers 
shall make an arrest when they have probable cause to believe that a crime is being committed 
or has been committed."); NEV. REv. STAT. § 171.1225 (1991) (requiring officers to inform 
suspected victims of acts of domestic violence that "[i]f I have probable cause to believe that 
an act of domestic violence has been committed against you in the last 4 hours I am required, 
unless mitigating circumstances exist, to arrest immediately the person suspected of committing 
the act''); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-21 (West Supp. 1993) ("[T]he law enforcement officer shall 
arrest the person who is alleged to be the person who subjected the victim to domestic violence 
... .''); OR. REv. STAT. § 133.055(2)(a) (1993) (noting that ''the officer shall arrest and take into 
custody the alleged assailant or potential assailant''); R.I. GEN. LAws § 12-29-3(8) (Supp. 1993) 
("When a law enforcement officer responds to a domestic violence situation and has probable 
cause to believe that a crime has been committed ... the officer shall arrest and take into 
custody the alleged perpetrator [in certain situations] .... ''); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 94 (1991) 
(noting that an officer "shall make an arrest without a warrant if the officer has probable cause 
to believe that a misdemeanor or felony involving domestic violence ... has been committed''). 
67 See, e.g., Daniel Goleman, Do Arrests Increase the Rates of Repeated Domestic 
Violence?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27,1991, at C8 (disputing the value of arrest alone in deterring 
repeated abuse). The Omaha Experiment, one of six similar studies funded by the National 
Institute of Justice, also did not support the findings of the Minneapolis experiment as to the 
value of arrest alone as a deterrent. Franklin W. Dunford et aI., The Role of Arrest in Domestic 
Assault: The Omaha Police Experiment, 28 CRIMINOLOGY 183, 204 (1990). 
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significantly affected the deterrent effect of arrest, a factor not considered in 
the original Minneapolis study.68 Shennan concluded that the deterrent effect 
of arrest alone shown in Minneapolis was a statistical fluke related to the low 
unemployment rate in that city at the time the study was conducted.69 Unem-
ployed batterers, in contrast to the employed arrestees in the original 
Minneapolis study, were not significantly deterred by arrest alone.70 As Sher-
man and Berk cautioned: 
[W]e favor a presumption of arrest; an arrest should be made unless there are 
good, clear reasons why an arrest would be counterproductive. We do not, 
however, favor requiring arrests in all misdemeanor domestic assault cases. 
Even if our findings were replicated in a number of jurisdictions, there is a good 
chance that arrest works far better for some kinds of offenders than others .... 
We feel it best to leave police a loophole to capitalize on that variation.'· 
Honolulu Police Chief Michael Nakamura has recognized the importance 
of training police about the seriousness of family abuse, and the necessity of 
providing guidance as to the decision to arrest.72 However, in urban Honolulu, 
limited jail space coupled with a serious backlog in the courts makes it 
unlikely that batterers will face incarceration. This is not just a Hawai'i 
problem; it happens on the mainland as well. For example, in Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin, out of 8,000 misdemeanor arrests for household violence last year, 
only fifty percent were prosecuted, and of those prosecuted only thirty percent 
resulted in convictions.73 
It seems clear that mandatory arrest statutes, if not part of a coordinated 
program, come "perilously close to encouraging greater jeopardy for victims 
unless accompanied by recommendations for massive changes in prosecutorial 
and judicial practices. In a judicial system which seldom tries spouse abuse 
offenders and rarely convicts them, women are seldom protected from violent 
reprisals. "74 
68 Dunford, supra note 67. The Milwaukee project found that among employed men, arrest 
deterred repeated battering, resulting in a 16 percent decrease in recidivism. Among the 
unemployed, however, arrest increased repeat violence by 44 percent. Id. 
69 Goleman, supra note 68. See also Roger Worthington, Value of Mandatory Arrest for 
Woman Beaters Questioned, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 19, 1991, at C5 ("Mandatory arrest puts us in the 
moral dilemma of reducing violence against women who are relatively well ofT (living with or 
married to an employed assailant), at the price of increasing violence against women whose 
abusers are unemployed.") (quoting Professor Lawrence Shennan). See STRAUS, supra note 
9,at31. 
70 See STRAUS, supra note 9, at 31. 
7. Sherman & Berk, supra note 58, at 270. 
72 See Kim, supra note I (quoting Honolulu Police Chief Michael Nakamura). 
73 World News Tonight, infra note 81. 
7. Sarah F. Berk & Donileen R. Loseke, "Handling" Family Violence: Situational 
Determinants of Police Arrest in Domestic Disturbances, IS LAW & SOC'Y REv. 317, 343 
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In 1981, Duluth, Minnesota became the first jurisdiction to enact a 
mandatory arrest policy for misdemeanor assaults.75 A follow-up study docu-
mented that with this program in place, 87 percent of the victims going 
through their court system's domestic violence program were living violence-
free three years later, meaning that the offenders had not committed new 
crimes.76 The 47 percent decrease in recidivism in the Duluth program could 
not be traced solely to arrest, but rather to the coordinated effort of various 
agencies.77 A key factor in both Duluth and Minneapolis was that the men 
who were arrested actually served time in jaiJ.18 Unless arrest results in 
conviction and punishment, it does not reliably deter further violence. Where 
punishment is certain, abusers quickly learn that the laws on the books are not 
empty threats, and violence drops. However, where an arrest is not accom-
panied by at least some amount of incarceration, the victim may be placed in 
an even more precarious position.79 Unfortunately, that is the present situation 
in Hawai'i, where the abuser is unlikely to spend any time injail following the 
arrest, and is therefore unlikely to be deterred from future acts of abuse. 
C. No-Drop Policies 
Victims are often reluctant to follow through with charges, because the 
abuser, through coercion, promises, or emotional ties, may force his victim to 
shield him from legal accountability. so A ''no-drop'' prosecutorial policy such 
as that in Hawai'i is a crucial part of a systematic program of deterring abuse, 
but it brings with it its own problems. Under a no-drop order, the victim can 
be arrested, jailed for contempt, and forced to pay court costs for failing to 
testify against the criminal who is still terrorizing her.81 Thus, making the 
(1980-81); see also Robert E. Worden & Alissa A. Pollitz, Police Arrests in Domestic 
Disturbances: A Further Look, 18 LAW &SOC'Y. REv. 105,118 (I 984)(announcing replication 
of the findings of the Berk & Loseke study). 
7S Hoffinan, supra note 6, at 23. 
76 Buel Tape, supra note 8. See also Ellen Pence, The Duluth Domestic Abuse Intervention 
Project, 6 HAMLINE L. REv. 247, 258 (1983) (police had contact with only 16% of domestic 
assailants from the seven to twelve months after arrest). 
77 Sarah Mausolf Buel, Recent Developments: Mandatory A "est for Domestic Violence, 
II HARVARD WOMEN'S L.J. 211,216 (1988). 
78 Sherman & Berk, supra note 58, at 268. 
79 Sari Horwitz, D. C. Police to Make A"ests in Domestic Violence Disputes: Cases to be 
Treated as Criminal Offenses, WASH. POST, June 3,1987, at AI, A7. 
80 Litsky, supra note 43, at 167; Pence, supra note 77, at 250. 
81 See Pence, supra note 76, at 260. "[T]he program otTers safety for victims while 
providing abusers with clear limits on their behavior, certain intervention, and a more system-
atic program for the purpose of changing their behavior." Id. at 255-69. In Brooklyn, New 
York, prosecutors will drop charges at the victim's request only after the victim has had 
counseling. Id. Madison, Wisconsin, prosecutors will prosecute with or without the victim's 
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victim responsible for the prosecutor's job of pursuing justice can reward the 
batterer and reinforce his sense of power and immunity from legal 
consequences.82 If the victims lack confidence that their attackers will be 
convicted, they may well be discouraged from coming forward in the first 
place. It is not enough that we in Hawai'i work in concert with the police, and 
encourage arrests and prosecutions; it is even more critical that we make it 
possible for our courts to handle the cases that the police and prosecutors 
bring to them. 
IV. THE MIND OF A BA TIERER 
To understand how the Committee's proposal for early intervention at the 
petty misdemeanor level can help end battering, we must understand why the 
batterer batters.83 Batterers tend to have a strong sense of entitlement;84 their 
life experience has led them to believe that violence is justifiable to get what 
they want, and to maintain control of their family and household members.8s 
Control is the batterer's life, and he typically feels entitled to batter when he 
feels out of control or powerless.86 Overcoming this sense of entitlement, 
rather than reinforcing it, is the key to overcoming abuse. 
The batterer shows a high capacity for planning, and an appreciation of 
cause and effect.87 He may show this by putting the children in another room, 
so they won't hear, taking offhis rings to avoid leaving scars, or only hitting 
areas that will be covered by clothing.88 The man who attacks and injures 
family and household members does not beat up the police officer who gives 
him a speeding ticket, or the co-worker who makes him look bad, or the boss 
who yells at him for being late to work, because he knows full well that there 
cooperation. World News Tonight (ABC television broadcast, June 27, 1994), available in 
LEXIS, News Library, File No. 4126-4. 
82 See David M. Zlotnick, Empowering the Battered Woman: The Use of Criminal 
Contempt Sanctions to Enforce Civil Protection Orders, 65 OIDO ST. L.J. 1153, 1215 n. 80, 
244-51 (1995) (discussing the prosecutor's role in stopping spousal abuse). 
83 RENATA V ASELLE-AUGENSTEIN & ANNETTE EHRLICH, MALE BATIERERS: EVIDENCE FOR 
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY IN INTIMATE VIOLENCE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 139, 144 
(Emilio C. Viano ed., 1992). 
84 See id. at 139. See also BARBARA STAR, HELPING THE ABUSER: INTERVENING 
EFFECTIVELY IN FAMILY VIOLENCE 34-35 (1983), cited in Welch, supra note 3, at n.34. 
8S Buel Tape, supra note 8. 
86 VASELLE-AUGENSTEIN & EHRLICH, supra note 83, at 143. 
87 Id. 
88 Buel Tape, supra note 8. 
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would be serious repercussions ifhe did.89 To put it bluntly, he chooses to use 
violence against his wife or girlfriend because he can do so with impunity.90 
Asking why battered women stay is the wrong question; it is a bit like 
asking why a hostage or prisoner of war "chooses" to stay with his tormen-
tor.91 Even ifit is possible to get away, leaving does not mean safety, and may 
trigger a fatal attack.92 Rather than put the onus on victims to escape their 
tormentors, we should impress upon batterers at the earliest possible stage that 
their actions have consequences. This is the first step in changing their behav-
ior.93 Repeat offenses are significantly fewer where there is early intervention 
and a coordinated program leading to conviction.94 In other words, the first 
step in reducing abuse is increasing the costs associated with battering. A 
coordinated program which intervenes at the first sign of violence has been 
shown to change the costlbenefit basis of battering without increasing the 
risks to the victim.9s To be effective, such a policy cannot be isolated; it must 
exist as part of a fully integrated response to violence, combining mandatory 
arrest, police training, guidelines for judges and prosecutors, services for 
victims, and rehabilitation and counselling for batterers, giving the communi-
ty, victims, assailants and children a clear message that battering is not accept-
able "even" in the family.96 
Sarah Buel, a Quincy, Massachusetts prosecutor specializing in household 
violence cases, has demonstrated that when the first. "petty" misdemeanor 
carries consequences, batterers choose another option.97 Buel grew up in a 
violent home, saw a brother murdered in connection with his involvement in 
gangs and drugs, and was herself a battered wife before becoming a prosecu-
tor.98 Her innovative leadership in pursuing early intervention into household 
violence· won her community a $100,000 Ford Foundation Innovations Award 
89 Id. 
90 Welch, supra note 3, at 1138 (citing VASELLE-AUGENSTEIN & EHRLICH, supra note 84, 
at 140). 
91 See Dee L.R. Graham and Edna Rawlings, Survivors of Terror: Battered Women, 
Hostages, and the Stockholm Syndrome, in F'EMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE (Kerri Vila 
& Michelle Bogard eds., 1988). Several researchers have applied the characteristics outlined 
by the Amnesty International "Report on Torture" (1973) to battered women. See, e.g., Mary 
Ann Dutton, The Dynamics of Domestic Violence: Understanding the Response From Battered 
Women, 68 FL. B.l. 24,28 n.7 (Oct. 1994). 
92 Buel Tape, supra note 8. 
93 Id. 
94 Buel, supra note 77, at 216. 
95 Welch, supra note 3, at 1139-40. 
96 Pence, supra note 76, at 254-55. 
97 Bue! Tape, supra note 8. 
98 Id. 
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for the Quincy Court Domestic Violence program.99 She started the Quincy 
program after she recognized that mandatory arrest alone was not enough; she 
realized that the reason for Duluth, Minnesota and Seattle's 47 percent 
reduction in repeat domestic violence cases, and San Diego's 59 percent 
reduction in its domestic homicide rate, was that in these programs the arrests 
resulted in convictions. IOO The Quincy program shows that batterers choose 
another option when they know there will be consequences. 101 
Duluth, Minnesota's violence intervention program, focusing on the 
psychology of the batterer, showed remarkable success from the start, as 77 
percent of those arrested for misdemeanor crimes of household violence pled 
guilty.102 The program effectively shifted the focus of intervention from the 
victim to the assailant, and in so doing, "enhanced the ability of the system to 
deter assailants by increasing the numbers of assailants convicted of assault 
and establishing serious consequences for battering."J03 The costs of arrest are 
not solely fmancial, of course; they can include time in jail, shame, the risk 
of divorce or separation from their partners, and loss of a job. lD4 Failure to 
arrest, on the other hand, tells the man that terrorizing and brutalizing "his" 
woman is not a crime and that he has nothing to fear if he beats the woman 
with whom he is, or was, involved. 105 
If we accept the overwhelming evidence that batterers batter by choice, and 
because the costs do not outweigh the rewards, we should expect this criminal 
behavior to decrease as the costs of committing it increase. In other words, 
we must intervene early enough and consistently enough to convince potential 
batterers not to engage in violence at all, and must teach batterers that what 
they are doing is wrong, illegal and will be punished. 106 Early intervention 
99 Elena Salzman, Note, The Quincy District Court Domestic Violence Prevention 
Program: A Model Legal Framework/or Domestic Violence Intervention, 74 B.U. L. REv. 329, 
338-63 (1994) (citing Patricia Nealon, Quincy Antibattering Effort Gets Grant, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Sept 23, 1992, at 10) (Ford Foundation selected Quincy from 1600 contenders for its Innova-
tions in State and Local Government Awards Program, including a $100,000 grant to duplicate 
the program nationwide). 
100 Buel Tape, supra note 8. 
101 Id. 
102 Pence, supra note 76, at 257-58. 
103 Id. at 269. 
104 Michael Steinman, Coordinated Criminal Justice Interventions and Recidivism Among 
Batterers, in WOMAN BATTERING: POUevREsPONSES, 221, 222 (Michael Steinman ed., 1991). 
105 EVA JEFFERSON PATERSON, How TIlE LEGAL SYSTEM REsPONDS TO BATTERED WOMEN, 
in BATTERED WOMEN, 79, 82-83 (Donna M. Moore ed., 1979). 
106 Specific deterrence rationales focus on the individual who has already committed an act 
of violence, and seeks to discourage him from committing further criminal acts. Alan 
Wertheimer, Criminal Justice and Public Policy: Statistical Lives and Prisoners' Dilemmas, 
33 RUTGERS L. REv. 730,734 (1981) (goal of specific deterrence is to stop criminals from 
committing future crimes). 
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also provides a "quarantine" effect whereby punishment may prevent some 
crime simply by isolating the criminal from society. 107 
Abuse does not start with a fatal or crippling attack; it starts small, with a 
slap, or a pUSh.108 Battering is addictive, and if nothing happens to stop it, 
battering is progressive. I09 Domestic violence is not about "losing it; it is 
about power, control, coercion."IIO Batterers show higher-than-normallevels 
of possessiveness, jealousy, and paranoia in a clinical setting. I I I They demon-
strate power and control by isolating their victim from friends, family, and 
community until the victim has nowhere to go, and no-one to tum to.112 A 
man who batters typically will not allow "his woman" to make any indepen-
dent decisions, and will want to know everything that she does. 113 The batte-
rer may appear ''nice, humorous, charming, and sensitive," outside the family 
circle while showing a "Jekyll and Hyde" personality at home. 1I4 He may 
appear guilty and contrite after he batters, but this is often a form of manipula-
tion rather than an indicator of change. 115 A batterer may go so far as to estab-
lish a list of "offenses" for which "his woman" can expect a beating. 116 If con-
fronted, he will explain that he slapped her because she burned the toast, or 
that he gave her a black eye because she flirted with the mailman. I 17 This, 
however, is not uncontrollable rage; this is "premeditation in every sense of 
the word."118 
107 Id. at 734-35. 
108 See, e.g., Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic 
Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1849, 1885 (1996) (If the batterer is not held 
accountable for his actions, domestic violence generally increases in both severity and 
frequency). The author notes, "[B]atterers are generally repeat criminal offenders. 'Males who 
make a habit of assaulting their female partners may commit serious crimes in the home as 
frequently as other offenders with more serious criminal records do on the street. ,n Id. at 1888. 
109 Id. Roni Young, Baltimore City State's Attorney and Director of the Domestic Violence 
Unit, notes: "It's not just Warren Moon. And it's not just 0.1. [Simpson]. People ask me why 
society is in denial over this issue. They're not in denial. They're in acceptance - accepting 
of the one slap, the one punch, not realizing what it can escalate into .... n Id. at 1910 n.265. 
110 Buel Tape, supra note 8. 
III VASELLE-AuGENSTEIN & EHRLICH, supra note 83, at 141, discussing the use of the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) test in understanding batterers' 
personalities. 
112 Michael Steinman, Lowering Recidivism Among Men Who Batter Women, 17 J. POLICE 
SCI. & ADMIN. 124 (1990). 
113 VASELLE-AUGENSTEIN & EHRLICH, supra note 83, at 142; see also STAR, supra note 84, 
at 34. 
114 See V ASELLE-AUGENSTEIN & EHRLICH, supra note 83, at 146. 
liS Welch, supra note 3, at 1138-39 (citing VASELLE-AuGENSTEIN & EHRLICH, ~pra note 
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Why do we condone this carnage? At least part of the reason is that 
condonation of ''wife abuse" has deep historical roots, so that it became news 
when law enforcement decided to treat it "as a crime."119 In the mid-to-late 
19th century, courts became somewhat less willing to give express approval 
of physical abuse,12O but criminal prosecutions were rare until the 1970s, and 
there were few attempts to study the inadequacies of the existing legal and 
social responses.121 
Our culture has tended to see household violence as a private concern; an 
attack on a member of the household was seen as a personal matter of a 
dysfunctional relationship, rather than as a vicious, violent crime committed 
by one citizen upon another. The view has been that "a man's home is his 
castle, "122 and that police should stay out of "private" family matters. l23 Is it 
any wonder that those who prey on their family and household members may 
believe that they have the right to do so, and do not take seriously the risk of 
punishment?124 By now it is clear that we must see domestic violence as 
119 See REPORT, supra note 1, at 2 (socialization of boys and girls leads directly to 
acceptance of violence against women; the view that men should dominate women and children, 
and that women and children should be punished when they resist domination is pervasive 
among batterers and many others in our community). See also Horwitz, supra at AI, A7. See, 
e.g., Bradley v. State, 1 Miss. (1 Walker) 156, 158 (1824) (approving physical "chastisement" 
of wife by husband), overruled by Harris v. State, 14 So. 266 (1894); State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 
(Phil. Law) 291, 291 (1868) (husband who attacked wife did not commit battery, though his 
violence would have been battery if victim had not been his wife); State v. Black, 60 N.C. 
(Win.) 263, 263 (1864) (law will not interfere with a man's "right" to inflict physical 
punishment on his wife). . 
120 See Fulgham v. State,46 Ala 143, 148 (Ala 1871) (holding that husband and wife "may 
be indicted for assault and battery upon each other"). See generally Thurman v. City of 
Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521,1528 (D. Conn. 1984) (giving history oflaw of spouse abuse). 
121 Barbara K. Finesmith, Police Response to Battered Women: A Critique and Proposals 
for Reform, 14 SETON HALL L. REv. 74, 80 (1983). See STRAUS, supra note 9, at 10. 
122 Welch, supra note 3, at 1145. 
123 See Litsky,supra note 43, at 162. Only recently have courts in most of the United States 
moved away from the express approval of inter-familial rape, striking down laws permitting a 
husband to rape his wife. See, e.g., Merton v. State, 500 So. 2d 1301 (Ala Crim. App. 1986) 
(marital exception to first-degree rape and sodomy statutes were unconstitutional under 14th 
amendment equal protection clause); People v. M.D., 595 N.E.2d 702 (Ill. 1992) (marital 
exemptions to criminal sexual assault statutes unconstitutional; right to marital privacy extends 
only to consensual marital relations); People v. Liberta, N.E.2d 567 (N.Y. 1984), cert. denied, 
471 U.S. 1020 (1985). But see, e.g., People v. Brown, 632 P.2d 1025 (Colo. 1981) (marital 
exception to rape statute does not create an arbitrary and irrational distinction and does not 
violate due process or equal protection) cited with approval in People v. Flowers, 644 P.2d 916 
(Colo. 1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 803 (1982) (lack of substantial federal question); 
State v. Taylor, 726 S.W.2d 335 (Mo. 1981) (marital exception to non-forcible sexual offenses 
does not violate constitution). 
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something that concerns us all. We cannot be silent and pretend that this is 
not happening in the families of Hawai' i. 125 
V .. CONCLUSION 
Despite our best efforts, abuse of family and household members remains 
a difficult and intractable problem with no easy solutions. 126 We must follow 
through on the efforts that have already been made by taking innovative steps 
to enable the courts to handle the cases that result from existing enforcement 
efforts. Even if we arrest, prosecute, and refuse to drop cases, our attempts 
will be a mockery unless we are able to send the batterers to jail. 127 
There is no doubt that the idea of reducing the classification of a battering 
offense carries a potent emotional symbolism. It is difficult not to feel, on an 
emotional level, that diminishing the maximum available sentence for first 
offenders somehow diminishes the importance of the crime. For this reason, 
the idea that "less is more" may challenge some of our preconceived notions 
about retribution and crime, but we need to rise to the challenge. We cannot 
let our desire to send a symbolic message overrule the demonstrated need for 
early intervention. 128 
We have all seen parents who constantly threaten their misbehaving 
children with dire punishments that the children know will not be carried out. 
125 See REPORT, supra note I, at 3. The REPORT notes: 
The Hawai'i Crime Brief issued by the Attorney General in April 1996 found that nearly 
30% of all homicides from 1985-1994 in the state were the result of domestic violence 
.... a study conducted by the Hawai'i State Commission on the Status of Women (1993) 
estimated that nearly 50,000 women in this state between the ages [of] 18 and 64 have 
been victims of domestic violence. The Department of Health's Plan for the Prevention 
of Injuries in Hawai'i (June 1995) reported that between 1989 and 1994 almost 100 
women were killed by men in Hawai'i. Most of the killers were partners, boyfriends, or 
acquaintances. 
[d. at 3. See also Buel Tape, supra note 8. 
126 See REPORT, supra note I, at Summary (unpaginated) (Hawai'i passed its first spousal 
abuse law in 1972; all police jurisdictions in Hawai'i follow policies of mandatory arrest upon 
probable cause to believe abuse has occurred, yet between 1989 and 1992 almost 100 women 
in Hawai'i were killed by men, most by partners, husbands, boyfriends, or acquaintances). 
121 REPORT, supra note I, at 20 (many persons arrested for HAW. REv. STAT. § 709-906 
violations agree to plead to a lesser offense, usually HAW. REv. STAT. § 707-712 (assault in the 
third degree) and serve no jail time). See also Litsky, supra note 43, at 169-70. In 1986, 
Massachusetts District Court Judge Paul Heffernan scolded Pamela Dunn for ''wasting his time" 
on domestic matters when she sought a safety order; the judge granted the order, but refused 
to order increased protection. Ms. Dunn's husband then kidnapped, shot, stabbed, and strangled 
her, and left her body in the town dump. Court Challenged in Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 
30, 1986, at A61. 
128 Buel Tape, supra note 8. 
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Not surprisingly, the children ignore the empty threats, and their behavior. 
becomes more incorrigible. Why can't we recognize that the same principle 
applies to the somewhat infantile personality of the batterer? Why are we 
surprised when he repeats his behavior after not being punished for early, 
relatively mild offenses, before his behavior is ingrained and incorrigible -
and before someone in his household dies? 
The first slap or shove must result in serious consequences, or the abuse 
will escalate. 129 We lack the resources to attack crime fully and effectively on 
all fronts, but targeting family abusers for prosecution at the petty misde-
meanor stage, before their behavior escalates to the point where a jury trial is 
called for, can help decrease not only household violence, but all of the crime 
and social ills that flow from it. We cannot ignore this problem until the vio-
lence escalates to the felony level, just to preserve the purely symbolic 
deterrent of the one year misdemeanor sentence. 
It seems logical to assume that longer and harsher sentences would deter 
crime, especially on the part of family abusers, who in most cases are not 
otherwise career criminals, but as H.L. Mencken once noted, "for every prob-
lem, there is some solution that is simple, neat, and wrong."130 The solutions 
of the past - upgrading offenses and tough mandatory sentences, seem 
simple and neat, but they are demonstrably wrong, because they carry within 
them a Catch-22 that prevents their being carried out. Get-tough measures 
may send a symbolic message to the electorate that their elected officials are 
"tough" on crime, but when the batterer knows that the ''tough'' sentence is an 
empty threat, there is no deterrence. The symbolic message is lost in the 
bloody reality. Unless the defendant believes that the punishment is highly 
certain to be imposed, symbolic statutory punishments are a cruel joke on the 
victims. 131 
It is unfortunate that any proposal to reduce domestic violence penalties is 
seen by some victims' advocates as symbolizing a lack of support for victims 
of violence. 132 However, if we have it in our power to improve the deterrent 
value of the law by imposing the mandatory 48 hours and discretionary month 
of imprisonment upon first offenders more swiftly and more predictably, 133 
129 REPORT, supra note 1, at 1 ("physical abuse is part of a continuum that typically begins 
with actions that undermine self-esteem, escalating verbal assaults, and attempts to isolate a 
victim from friends and family . . . . In most situations, the physical violence increases in 
severity and frequency over time"). 
130 Frank Daily, Preserve the Lawyer's Tools, 7 A.B.A.}. (Feb. 1986) 38, 40 (quoting H.L. 
Mencken). 
131 Steinman, supra note 104, at 222. 
132 Notes from Penal Code Commission deliberations, supra note 26 (comments ofNanci 
Kriedman, Victims' Advocate). See also infra Appendix B. 
133 Id. 
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and if we instead choose symbols over substance, that is a true failure to 
support those victims. As things stand now, abusers are getting the message 
that their actions have no consequences.1J.4 The present law creates the para-
doxical result that more assailants are freed than punished, and teaches these 
violent men that attacking others is acceptable, as long as it is "only" a 
member of the family or household. 
We should ask ourselves what message it sends to have a one-year sentence 
on the books for a first offense, when there is virtually no chance of actually 
receiving it. Even if Hawai'i's courts could cease trying any other kind of 
case but household violence, it would take an increase of 10 percent more 
courts, judges, and staffs, costing millions more tax dollars, to eliminate 
permanently the backlog in domestic cases,135 and that would undoubtedly 
create a backlog in the prosecutions of other serious crimes, such as murder, 
rape and robbery. 
There is no way around this dilemma as long as a first offense without 
serious injury remains a full misdemeanor and qualifies for a jury trial. One 
could reasonably conclude that the present law's deterrent effect is nil, as evi-
denced by the high recidivism rate of these offenders. If we can change our 
responses to family terrorism from the symbolic to the practical, we can 
expect to see some real success in curbing all forms of crime in Hawai' i by 
cutting it off at the source: the violent family. 
It is time to stop clinging to symbols - we need results. To achieve this 
we must look beyond our cherished preconceptions and get-tough rhetoric and 
try to understand what does and doesn't work. If we don't attempt some real 
solutions, we are not only abandoning our children, but we are colluding with 
the batterers. We are ensuring that they get the message that this behavior 
will be tolerated, and that we will maintain a system that ensures that there are 
no consequences as long as the violence is "only" in the family. 
134 Notes from Penal Code Commission deliberations, supra note 26 (comments of Office 
of the Public Defender). See also infra Appendix B (many cases dismissed because of 
backlog). 
135 Notes from Penal Code Commission deliberations, supra note 26. 
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Appendix A: Committee to Conduct Comprehensive Review of the Hawai 'i 
Penal Code's Proposed Changes to Selected Sections of the Hawai'i 
Revised Statutes 
Part n. ABUSE OF FAMILY OR HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS 
§ 709-910. Definitions of terms in this part. In this part, unless a different 
meaning is plainly required, "family or household members" means spouses 
or former spouses, parents, children, and persons jointly residing or formerly 
residing in the same dwelling unit. 
§ 709-911. Duty of police in investigation of abuse of family or household 
members. 
(1) the police, in investigating any complaint of abuse of a family or 
household member, may, upon request, transport the abused person to 
a hospital or safe shelter. 
(2) Any police officer may, with or without a warrant, arrest a person if 
the officer has probable cause to believe that the person is physically 
abusing, or has physically abused, a family or household member. 
(3) Any police officer who arrests a person pursuant to this part shall not 
be subject to any civil or criminal liability; provided that the police 
officer acts in good faith, upon reasonable belief, and does not exer-
cise unreasonable force in effecting such arrest. 
§ 709-912. Abuse of family or household members; penalty. 
(1) A person commits the offense of abuse of family or household 
members ifthe person intentionally, knOwingly, or recklessly physi-
cally abuses a family or household member. 
(2) A person who commits the offense of abuse of a family or household 
member shall be sentenced as follows: 
(a) For a first offense, to a one-year term of probation with a man-
datory condition of imprisonment of not less than forty-eight 
hours and not more than thirty days; and 
(b) For any subsequent offense which occurs within five years ofa 
previous offense which resulted in a conviction under this sec-
tion, to a one-year term of probation with a mandatory condition 
of imprisonment of not less than thirty days and not more than 
one year. 
(3) Whenever a court sentences a person pursuant to subsection (2), it 
shall also require that the offender undergo any available domestic 
violence treatment and appropriate program(s) ordered by the court. 
The court may suspend any portion of the term of imprisonment im-
posed, except for the required minimum period of imprisonment under 
subsection 2(a) and (b) upon the condition that the defendant remain 
conviction-free and complete any court-ordered treatment and 
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counseling. Upon a finding of good cause, the court may grant early 
discharge from probation. 
(4) If a person is ordered by the court to undergo any treatment or 
counseling, that person shall provide adequate proof of compliance 
with the court's order. The court shall order a subsequent hearing at 
which the person is required to make an appearance, on a date certain, 
to detennine whether the person has completed the ordered treatment. 
The court may waive the subsequent hearing and appearance where a 
court officer has established that the person has completed the treat-
ment ordered by the court. 
§ 709-913. Safety order; refusal to comply; penalty. 
(1) Any police officer, with or without a warrant, may take the following 
course of action where the officer has reasonable grounds to believe 
that there was recent physical abuse inflicted by one person upon a 
family or household member, whether or not such physical abuse 
occurred in the officer's presence: 
(a) The police officer may make reasonable inquiry of the family or 
household member upon whom the officer believes recent physi-
cal abuse has been inflicted, and of other witnesses as there may -
be; 
(b) Where the police officer has reasonable grounds to believe that 
there is probable danger of further physical abuse being inflicted 
by one person upon a family or household member, the police 
officer may lawfully order the person to leave the premises for a 
period of twenty-four hours; provided that the person is allowed 
to enter the premises with police escort to collect any necessary 
personal effects; 
(c) Where the police officer makes the fmding referred to in (b) and 
the incident occurs after 12:00 p.m. on any Friday, or on any 
Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the order to leave the pre-
mises shall commence immediately and be in full force but the 
twenty-four hour period shall be enlarged and extended until 4:30 
p.m. on the first day folloWing the weekend or legal holiday; 
(d) All persons who are ordered to leave as stated above shall be 
given a written warning citation stating the date, time, and 
location of the warning and stating the penalties for violating the 
warning. A copy of the warning citation shall be retained by the 
police officer and attached to a written report which shall be 
submitted in all cases. A third copy of the warning citation shall 
be given to the abused person; and 
(e) If the person so ordered refuses to comply with the order to leave 
the premises or returns to the premises before the expiration of 
the safety period, the person shall be placed under arrest. 
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(2) A person commits the offense of refusal to comply with a safety order 
when the person refuses to comply with the lawful order of a police 
officer under this section. The person shall be sentenced as follows: 
(a) For any offense not preceded within a one-year period by a 
conviction under this section, to a one-year term of probation 
with a mandatory condition of imprisonment of not less than 
forty-eight hours and not more than thirty days; and 
(b) For any subsequent offense which occurs within one year of a 
previous conviction under this section, to a one-year term of 
probation with a mandatory condition of imprisonment of not 
less than thirty days, and not more than one year. 
(3) Whenever a court sentences a person pursuant to subsection (2), it 
shall also require that the offender undergo any available domestic 
violence treatment and appropriate program(s) ordered by the court. 
The court may suspend any portion of the term of imprisonment im-
posed, except for the required mandatory minimum period of 
imprisonment under subsection (2)(a) and (b), upon the condition that 
the defendant not engage in conduct that would constitute an offense 
under this part and complete any court-ordered treatment and counsel-
ing. Upon a finding of good cause, the court may grant early dis-
charge from probation. 
(4) An offender shall provide adequate proof of compliance with any 
order of the court entered pursuant to subsection (3). The court shall 
order a subsequent hearing at which the person is required to make an 
appearance, on a date certain, to determine whether the person has 
completed the ordered treatment. The court may waive the subsequent 
hearing and appearance where a court officer has established that the 
person has completed the treatment ordered by the court. 
§ 709-914. Rights of the family or household member. 
(1) A family or household member who alleges physical abuse by another 
person may petition the family court, with the assistance of the prose-
cuting attorney of the applicable county, for a penal summons or arrest 
warrant to issue forthwith, or may file a criminal complaint through 
the prosecuting attorney of the applicable county. 
(2) When the respondent is taken into custody pursuant to an arrest 
warrant, the respondent shall be brought before the family court at the 
first possible opportunity. The court may then dismiss the petition or 
hold the respondent in custody subject to bail. Where the petition is 
not dismissed, a hearing shall be set. 
(3) This section shall not operate as a bar against prosecution under any 
other section of this Code in lieu of prosecution under this part. 
(4) It shall be the duty of the prosecuting attorney of the applicable county 
to assist any complainant under this section in the preparation of the 
penal summons or arrest warrant. 
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(5) This section shall not preclude the physically abused family or 
household member from pursuing any other remedy under law or in 
equity. 
§ 709-915. Expungement. If the offense committed under this part is the only 
crime committed by the defendant for a period of not less than ten years, the 
person may apply for an order to expunge from all official records all recorda-
tion relating to the person's arrest, trial, and finding of guilt. 
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Appendix B: Committee to Conduct Comprehensive Review of the Hawai 'i 
Penal Code Committee Commentary 
Some of the amendments to the household member abuse offense are 
purely formal, as in the creation of a new Part n, which will heighten the 
visibility of this law. The proposed definition of "family or household mem-
bers" in § 709-910, for example, differs in no substantial way from the defmi-
tion of the same term currently contained in the second paragraph of § 709-
906(1). But having a separate definition section, with its own title, has two 
advantages: (1) It conforms the formulation of this offense to the model used 
throughout the Hawaii Penal Code; see e.g., §§ 701-118, 703-300, 707-700, 
708-800, and 712-1240; and (2) it facilitates recognition and location of this 
provision by users and researchers, and thus makes the law more accessible. 
The same can be said of proposed §§ 709-911 (compare existing § 709-906136 
(1), (2), (3), and (7), 709-913 (1» (compare existing § 709-906 (8), (9), (10), 
(11), and (12), and 709-915) (compare existing § 709-906 (13». The 
expungement provision of proposed § 709-915 requires ten years of abuse-
free behavior which represents a doubling of the current period of 
qualification for expungement. 
The significant changes to current law are in proposed §§ 709-912 and 709-
913 (2), the punishment provisions for household member abuse and refusal 
to comply with a police officer's safety order. Current law classifies all 
instances of these offenses as misdemeanors, even though the mandatory jail 
sentence for first offenders is only 48 hours. The committee proposes, in §§ 
709-912 and 709-913, to specify the punishment for first offenders as "a one-
year term of probation with a mandatory condition of imprisonment of not 
less than forty-eight hours and not more than thirty days." The current 
mandatory 48 hours of imprisonment is thus retained, the real difference being 
that the proposal caps the available discretionary imprisonment for first 
offenders at 30 days, whereas the current misdemeanor classification, see 
§ 706-663,\31 envisions possible imprisonment for up to one year. The reasons 
for the shift from one year to 30 days are (1) that the amendments will have 
little or no effect on the lengths of sentences actually imposed on first offend-
ers, and (2) the amendment will eliminate the right to jwy trial, reduce (if not 
eliminate) the backlog of household member abuse cases awaiting jwy trials, 
and thus enable the Family Court efficiently to administer the law in this area. 
There is no need to retain first-offense household member abuse at the 
misdemeanor level. Imprisonment sentences in excess of 30 days are 
extremely rare, bearing in mind that cases involving any substantial degree of 
bodily injwy are prosecuted as assaults under §§ 707-710 or 707-711. 138 
Indeed, the committee has learned that 95 percent of the sentences for § 709-
906 convictions are for the minimum 48 hours of imprisonment. First 
136 See text of HAW. REv. STAT. § 706-906, infra Appendix D. 
137 See text of HAW. REv. STAT. § 706-663, supra note 24. 
138 See text of HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 707-710,707-711, infra Appendix D. 
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offenders whose abuse does not physically injure their victims do not deserve 
more than 30 days imprisonment. What counts is the mandatory 48 hours, 
and the proposal wisely retains this deterrent feature of existing law. The 
result of this analysis is that the current misdemeanor classification is 
functionally unnecessary, and therefore offers no benefit to balance the enor-
mous cost occasioned by jury demands and clogged court calendars. 
As this comment is written, efforts are being made to reduce the number of 
household member abuse cases awaiting jury trials in O'ahu's family court, 
but every week occasions an average of 40 to 50 more jury trial demands. 
Existing and foreseeable judicial resources are inadequate to adjudicate these 
cases; in consequence, many cases are dismissed for want of speedy trials, 
pled to other charges in order to avoid the mandatory 48 hours. Defense 
counsel cannot be faulted for seeking jury trials in a system that guarantees 
jury trials. Nor can the Judiciary be faulted for giving priority to murder and 
other serious felony cases. Nor should the Legislature be faulted if it opts to 
solve the problem by reclassifying the crime so as to eliminate a penalty -
on the books but never employed - that, because of sheer availability, 
triggers the right to jury trial. 
Another key feature of this proposal is the mandatory sentencing of first 
offenders and repeat offenders to one year of probation, which will facilitate 
the imposition and completion of the treatment programming that is mandated 
by §§ 709-912(3) and 709-913(3). 
Repeat offender sentencing is unaffected by this proposal, except that a 
mandatory one-year term of probation is added to the mandatory 30 days 
imprisonment. 
This proposal will encounter opposition, not because of reduction in 
punishment, but because of fears that the symbolism of an apparent downward 
reclassification will somehow mark us all as having failed to support the 
victims of domestic violence. But the proposal is designed to improve the 
deterrent efficacy of the law by imposing the mandatory 48 hours and discre-
tionary month of imprisonment upon first offenders more swiftly and with 
more predictability. And it will surely do that. What better way to combat the 
problem we rightly deplore than with actual punishment administered 
promptly? 
The committee's ch. 709 proposal should be read in connection with its 
recommendation that a fourth degree assault offense at the petty misdemeanor 
level, see proposed § 707-712.5, and consisting of the "physical abuse" of 
another person, be established by the Legislature. The intent is to achieve 
symmetry between the ordinary assault and household member abuse sections, 
and thus to avoid even an implication that the code views domestic violence 
more permissively than other forms of interpersonal assault. 
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Appendix C: Proposed Amendment to Hawai'i Revised Statutes 
§ 707-712.5 
The Committee proposed the following additional provision to bring non-
family assaults in line with assaults on family and household members: 
§ 707-712.5 Assault in the fourth degree. 
(1) A person commits the offense of assault in the fourth degree if the 
person intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly physically abuses 
another person. 
(2) Assault in the fourth degree is a petty misdemeanor. 
Comment: 
The intent is to achieve parity between the lowest assault offense and the 
crimes against household members, see ch. 709, Part II, (proposed). Since 
there" seems to be no good reason to treat either of these groups of victims 
differently from the other, the proposed fourth degree assault offense parallels 
the constitutionally "petty" abuse "of household member offense, § 709-9~2 
(proposed). The intent is that cases construing "physical abuse" in the ch. 709 
context, e.g., State v. Laborde, 71 Haw. 53,781 P.2d 1041 (1989) (dictum that 
hitting another person constitutes "physical abuse"); State v. Kameenui, 69 
Haw. 620, 753 P.2d 1250 (1988) (punching in the face and shoving against a 
wall); State v. Garcia, 9 Haw. App. 325, 839 P.2d 530 (1992) (hitting in face), 
be applicable here as well. 
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Appendix D: Selected Current Sections of the Hawai 'i Revised Statutes 
§ 134-7.5 Seizure of firearms in domestic abuse situations; requirements; 
return of. 
(a) Any police officer who has reasonable grounds to believe that a person 
has recently assaulted or threatened to assault a family or household 
member may seize all fireanns and ammunition that the police officer 
has reasonable grounds to believe were used or threatened to be used 
in the commission of the offense. The police officer may seize any 
firearms or ammunition thatare in plain view of the officer or were 
discovered pursuant to a consensual search, as necessary for the 
protection of the officer or any family or household member. 
Fireanris seized under this section shall be taken to the appropriate 
county police department for safekeeping or as evidence. 
(b) Upon taking possession of a firearm or ammunition, the officer shall 
give the owner or person who was in lawful possession of the firearm 
or ammunition a receipt identifying the firearm or ammunition and 
indicating where the firearm or ammunition can be recovered. 
(c) The officer taking possession of the firearm or ammunition shall 
notify the person against whom the alleged assault or threatened 
assault was inflicted of remedies and services available to victims of 
domestic violence, including the right to apply for a domestic abuse 
restraining order. 
(d) The firearm or ammunition shall be made available to the owner or 
person who was in lawful possession of the firearm or ammunition 
within seven working days after the seizure when: 
(1) The firearm or ammunition are not retained for use as evidence; 
(2) The firearm or ammunition are not retained because they are 
possessed illegally; 
(3) The owner or person who has lawful possession of the firearm or 
. ammunition is not restrained by an order of any court from 
possessing a firearm or ammunition; and 
(4) No criminal charges are pending against the owner or person who 
has lawful possession of the firearm or ammunition when a re-
straining order has already issued. 
§ 586-4 Temporary restraining order. 
(a) Upon petition to a family court judge, a temporary restraining order 
may be granted without notice to restrain either or both parties from 
contacting, threatening, or physically abusing each other, 
notwithstanding that a complaint for annulment, divorce, or separation 
has not been filed. The order may be granted to any person who, at the 
time such order is granted, is a family or household member as 
defined in section 586-1 or who filed a petition on behalf of a family 
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or household member. The order shall enjoin the respondent or person 
to be restrained from performing any combination of the following 
acts: 
(1) Contacting, threatening or physically abusing the petitioner(s); 
(2) Contacting, threatening or physically abusing any person(s) 
residing at the petitioner(s)'s residence; 
(3) Telephoning the petitioner(s); 
(4) Entering or visiting the petitioner(s)'s residence; or 
(5) Contacting, threatening or physically abusing the petitioner(s) at 
work. 
(b) The family court judge may issue the ex parte temporary restraining 
order orally, if the person being restrained is present in court. The 
order shall state that there is probable cause to believe that a recent 
past act or acts of abuse have occurred, or that threats of abuse make 
it probable that acts of abuse may be imminent. The order shall further 
state that the temporary restraining order is necessary for the purpose 
of preventing acts of abuse, or a recurrence of actual domestic abuse, 
and assuring a period of separation of the parties involved. The order 
shall describe in reasonable detail the act or acts sought to be 
restrained. Where necessary, the order may require either or both of 
the parties involved to leave the premises during the period of the 
order, and may also restrain the party or parties to whom it is directed 
from contacting, threatening, or physically abusing the applicant's 
family or household members. The order shall not only be binding 
upon the parties to the action, but also upon their officers, agents, 
servants, employees, attorneys, or any other persons in active concert 
or participation with them. The order shall enjoin the respondent or 
person to be restrained from performing any combination· of the 
following acts: 
(1) Contacting, threatening or physically abusing the petitioner(s); 
(2) Contacting, threatening or physically abusing any person(s) 
residing at the petitioner(s)'s residence; 
(3) Telephoning the petitioner(s); 
(4) Entering or visiting the petitioner(s)'s residence; or 
(5) Contacting, threatening or physically abusing the petitioner(s) at 
work. 
(c) When a temporary restraining order is granted pursuant to this chapter 
and the respondent or person to be restrained knows of the order, 
violation of the restraining order is a misdemeanor. A person 
convicted under this section shall undergo treatment or counseling at 
any available domestic violence program as ordered by the court. The 
court shall additionally sentence a person convicted under this section 
as follows: 
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(1) For a first conviction for violation of the temporary restraining 
order the person shall serve a mandatory minimum jail sentence 
of forty-eight hours; 
(2) For the second and any subsequent conviction for violation of the 
temporary restraining order the person shall serve a mandatory 
minimum jail sentence of thirty days. 
The court may suspend any jail sentence, except for the 
mandatory sentences under paragraphs (1) and (2), upon 
condition that the defendant remain alcohol and drug-free, 
conviction-free or complete court-ordered assessments or 
counseling. Nothing in this section shall be construed as limiting 
the discretion of the judge to impose additional sanctions 
authorized in sentencing for a misdemeanor. 
§ 586-11 Violation of an order for protection. 
Whenever an order for protection is granted pursuant to this chapter, a 
respondent or person to be restrained who knowingly or intentionally violates 
the order for protection is guilty of a misdemeanor. The court shall sentence 
a violator to appropriate counseling and shall sentence a person convicted 
under this section as follows: 
(1) For a first conviction for violation of the order for protection: 
(A) That is in the nature of non-domestic abuse, a violator may be 
sentenced to a jail sentence of forty-eight hours; 
(B) That is in the nature of domestic abuse, a violator shall be sen-
tenced to a mandatory minimum jail sentence of not less than 
forty-eight hours; 
(2) For a second conviction for violation of the order for protection: 
(A) That is in the nature of non-domestic abuse, and occurs after a 
first conviction for violation of the same order that was in the 
nature of non-domestic abuse, a violator shall be sentenced to a 
mandatory minimum jail sentence of not less than forty-eight 
hours; 
(B) That is in the nature of domestic abuse, and occurs after a first 
conviction for violation of the same order that was in the nature 
of domestic abuse, a violator shall be sentenced to a mandatory 
minimum jail sentence of not less than thirty days; 
(C) That is in the nature of non-domestic abuse, and occurs after a 
first conviction for violation of the same order that was in the 
nature of domestic abuse, a violator shall be sentenced to a 
mandatory minimum jail sentence of not less than forty-eight 
hours, unless the court, in writing, finds that the violation does 
not warrant a jail sentence and provides the reasons for its 
decision; 
(D) That is in the nature of domestic abuse, and occurs after a first 
conviction for violation of the same order that is in the nature of 
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non- domestic abuse, a violator shall be sentenced to a mandatory 
minimum jail sentence of not less than forty-eight hours; 
(3) For any subsequent violation that occurs after a second conviction for 
violation of the same order for protection, the court shall impose a 
mandatory minimum sentence of not less than thirty days 
imprisonment. 
The court may suspend any jail sentence under subparagraphs (l)(A) and 
(2)(C), upon appropriate conditions such as that the defendant remain alcohol 
and drug-free, conviction-free, or complete court-ordered assessments or 
counseling. Nothing in this section shall be construed as limiting the discre-
tion of the judge to impose additional sanctions authorized in sentencing for 
a misdemeanor offense. All remedies for the enforcement of judgments shall 
apply to this chapter. 
§ 707-710 Assault in the first degree. 
(1) A person commits the offense of assault in the first degree if he 
intentionally or knowingly causes serious bodily injury to anot.1J.er 
person. 
(2) Assault in the first degree is a class B felony. 
§ 707-711 Assault in the second degree. 
(1) A person commits the offense of assault in the second degree if: 
(a) The person intentionally or knowingly causes substantial bodily 
injury to another; 
(b) The person recklessly causes serious bodily injury to another 
person; 
(c) The person intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to a 
correctional worker, as defined in section 710-1031(2), who is 
engaged in the performance of duty or who is within a 
correctional facility; 
(d) The person intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to 
another person with a dangerous instrument; or 
(e) The person intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to an 
educational worker who is engaged in the performance of duty or 
who is within an educational facility. For the purposes of this 
section, "educational worker" means any administrator, special-
ist, counselor, teacher, or employee of the department of 
education, or a person who is a volunteer in a school program, 
activity, or function that is established, sanctioned, or approved 
by the department of education or a person hired by the 
department of education on a contractual basis and engaged in 
carrying out an educational function. 
(2) Assault in the second degree is a class C felony. 
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§ 709-906 Abuse of family and household members; penalty. 
(1) It shall be unlawful for any person, singly or in conc,ert, to physically 
abuse a family or household member, or to refuse compliance with the 
lawful order of a police officer under subsection (4). The police, in 
investigating any complaint of abuse of a family or household member 
may, upon request, transport the abused person to a hospital or safe 
shelter. 
For the purposes of this section, "family or household member" means 
spouses or former spouses, parents, children, and persons jointly residing or 
formerly residing in the same dwelling unit. 
(2) Any police officer may, with or without a warrant, arrest a person if 
the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person is 
physically abusing, or has physically abused, a family or household 
member, and that the person arrested is guilty thereof. 
(3) A police officer who has reasonable grounds to believe that the person 
is physically abusing, or has physically abused, a family or household 
member shall prepare a written report. 
(4) Any police officer, with or without a warrant, may take the following 
course of action where the officer has reasonable grounds to believe 
that there was recent physical abuse or harm inflicted by one person 
upon a family or household member, whether or not such physical 
abuse or harm occurred in the officer's presence: 
(a) The police officer may make reasonable inquiry of the family or 
household member upon whom the officer believes recent 
physical abuse or harm has been inflicted and other witnesses as 
there may be; 
(b) Where the police officer has reasonable grounds to believe that 
there is probable danger of further physical abuse or harm being 
inflicted by one person upon a family or household member, the 
police officer may lawfully order the person to leave the 
premises for a cooling offperiod of twenty-four hours; provided 
that the person is allowed to enter the premises with police escort 
to collect any necessary personal effects; 
(c) Where the police officer makes the finding referred to in (b) and 
the incident occurs after 12:00 p.m. on any Friday, or on any 
Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, the order to leave the premises 
shall commence immediately and be in full force but the 
twenty-four hour period shall be enlarged and extended until 4:30 
p.m. on the first day following the weekend or legal holiday; 
(d) All persons who are ordered to leave as stated above shall be 
given a written warning citation stating the date, time, and loca-
tion of the warning and stating the penalties for violating the 
warning. A copy of the warning citation shall be retained by the 
police officer and attached to a written report which shall be 
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submitted in all cases. A third copy of the warning citation shall 
be given to the abused person; . and 
(e) If the person so ordered refuses to comply with the order to leave 
the premises or returns to the premises before the expiration of 
the cooling off period, the person shall be placed under arrest for 
the purpose of preventing further physical abuse or harm to the 
family or household member; and 
(f) The police officer may seize all firearms and ammunition that the 
police officer has reasonable grounds to believe were used or 
threatened to be used in the commission of an offense under this 
section. 
(5) Abuse of a family or household member, and refusal to comply with 
the lawful order of a police officer under subsection (4) are 
misdemeanors and the person shall be sentenced as follows: 
(a) For the first offense the person shall serve a minimum jail 
sentence of forty-eight hours; and 
(b) For a second offense and any other subsequent offense which 
occurs within one year of the previous offense the person shall be 
termed a "repeat offender" and serve a minimum jail sentence of 
thirty days. 
(6) Whenever a court sentences a person pursuant to section 709-906(5), 
it shall also require that the offender undergo any available domestic 
violence treatment and counseling programs ordered by the court. 
However, the court may suspend any portion of a jail sentence, except 
for the mandatory sentences under section 709-906(5)(a) and (5)(b), 
upon the condition that the defendant remain arrest-free and 
conviction-free or complete court ordered counseling. 
(7) Any police officer who arrests a person pursuant to this section shall 
not be subject to any civil or criminal liability; provided that the police 
officer acts in good faith, upon reasonable belief, and does not 
exercise unreasonable force in effecting such arrest. 
(8) The family or household member who has been physically abused or 
harmed by another person may petition the family court, with the 
assistance of the prosecuting attorney of the applicable county, for a 
penal summons or arrest warrant to issue forthwith, or may file a 
criminal complaint through the prosecuting attorney of the applicable 
county. 
(9) The respondent shall be taken into custody and brought before the 
family court at the first possible opportunity. The court may then 
dismiss the petition or hold the respondent in custody, subject to bail. 
Where the petition is not dismissed, a hearing shall be set. 
(10) This section shall not operate as a bar against prosecution under any 
other section of this Code in lieu of prosecution for abuse of a family 
or household member. 
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(11) It shall be the duty of the prosecuting attorney of the applicable county 
to assist any victim under this section in the preparation of the penal 
summons or arrest warrant. 
(12) This section shall not preclude the physically abused or harmed family 
or household member from pursuing any other remedy under law or 
in equity. 
(13) Upon dismissal of such person and discharge of the proceeding against 
the person under this section, such person, if the offense is the only 
offense against the other family or household member for a period of 
not less than five years, may apply for an order to expunge from all 
official records all recordation relating to the person's arrest, trial, 
fmding of guilt, and dismissal and discharges pursuant to this section. 
If the court determines, after hearing, that such person was dismissed 
and the proceedings against the person were discharged and that no 
other similar offenses were charged against the person for a period of 
not less than five years, it shall enter such order. 
(14) If a person is ordered by the court to undergo any treatment or 
counseling, that person shall provide adequate proof of compliance 
with the court's order. The court shall order a subsequent hearing at 
which the person is required to make an appearance, on a date certain, 
to determine whether the person has completed the ordered treatment. 
The court may waive the subsequent hearing and appearance where a 
court officer has established that the person has completed the 
treatment ordered by the court. 
